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FREEDOM AND CHOICE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
John H. Garvey*
The constitutionalrights of children, the mentally ill, and other
legally incompetent persons have been the subject of much litigation
in the past twenty years. In this Article, Professor Garvey develops
a general theory to explain the different ways in which persons of
diminished capacity can be said to enjoy constitutionalprotections.
He first notes that, of the various constitutional provisions, only
one kind -freedoms, which protect the right to make choices pose serious difficulties when applied to persons of diminished capacity. He then proposes a hierarchy of ways in which we can
attributefreedoms to such persons: the laissez-faire notion that all
persons (including incompetents) are to be treated identically, the
instrumental idea that grantingfreedoms to incompetents achieves
extrinsic goals such as training, and the surrogate notion that
persons who cannot make choices for themselves should be able to
have those closest to them choose on their behalf. ProfesssorGarvey
concludes that, when these options fail and the state takes an
incompetent person under its control, the state owes to the incompetent the full package of duties owed by other guardians to those
under their control, including treatment in the case of the mentally
ill or education in the case of children.

1

OW do we justify the attribution of constitutional freedoms to people, such as children and the mentally ill,
who are not capable of making choices rationally? There are
differences between freedoms and other kinds of constitutional
rights that make problematic the ascription of freedoms to
such people. One such difference is that the consequences of
securing rights are more predictable than the consequences of
recognizing freedoms; if I am insane and the state seizes my
house, I can exercise my property, rightto get it back, and
that's that. But freedoms afford a protection to choice that
makes their consequences uncertain; if, despite my insanity, I

am entitled to freedom of speech, I may forge prescriptions for
valium or violate the copyright laws.

A second difference

between freedoms and other rights is that freedoms may have

* Law Alumni Professor, University of Kentucky Law School. J.D., 1974, Harvard. I am greatly indebted to the National Endowment for the Humanities for the
generous support it has given me to complete this project. I would also like to thank
Laurence Houlgate, Todd Rakoff, and Philip Ward for their careful reading and
criticism of an earlier draft. Finally, I must express my appreciation to Sarah Jenkins
for her help with Part Im, and to Lee Teitelbaum and the Family and Juvenile Law
Section of the Association of American Law Schools for allowing me to present my
ideas at the Section's annual meeting.

1756

I98I]

FREEDOM AND CHOICE

1757

varying values for different individuals, whereas the values of
other kinds of rights seem to remain constant for all claimants:
The fact that I am in a coma does not seem to diminish the
value of my house to me, but freedom of speech means little
to one biologically incapable of speaking.
In this Article, I try to show that these intuitive differences
penetrate the structure of rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution and require new ways of justifying the attribution of freedoms to children, the mentally ill or retarded,
and those who are senile or comatose. Part I probes the
structure of constitutional freedoms and shows how they contrast with other constitutional rights, with regard to both the
conduct protected and the characteristics required of claimants. Parts 11-V explore the possible grounds for ascribing
freedoms to a person incapable of rational choice, despite the
difficulties enumerated in Part I. I consider the possibilities of
treating such a person as if he were in fact able to formulate
his own values; of permitting him freedoms now so that he
will know what to do with them when, as we hope, he becomes fully competent in the future; of accepting as binding
the choices made on his behalf by those who stand closest to
him; and even of imposing on the state a constitutional obligation to make such choices as surrogate for the incompetent
person.
I.

THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

There is a critical distinction between constitutional freedoms' and other constitutional protections: A freedom protects
from state-imposed constraint individual choices to perform or
not to perform certain actions, and to pursue or not to pursue
certain conditions of character. 2 , Freedom of speech protects
both the choice to speak and the choice to be silent; 3 the free
II

shall use the words "freedom" and "liberty" interchangeably to indicate those

constitutional provisions that protect an individual's ability to choose. This generally
tracks the language of the Constitution. See pp. 1757-58 infra. There are several
provisions, however, such as the "right . . . to vote" and the "right . . . peaceably
to assemble," that behave like freedoms although they are designated "rights."
2 See generally F. OPPENHEIM, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM (ig6x); J. RAWLS, A
THEoRY OF JUSTICE 201-05 (2972); MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76
PHILOSOPHY REV. 322 (2967). The triadic approach does not command universal
assent. See generally M. ADLER, THE IDEA OF FREEDOM (2958); I. BERLIN, FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxvii-lxiii, 118-72 (I969); W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING ch. 1 (1923).

3 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (i977); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (i943).
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exercise of religion guarantees that the state can no more
command piety than it can forbid it. 4 Likewise, the liberty
protected by the due process clause entrusts to individuals the
decision whether to bear children or remain childless. s By
contrast, although other constitutional protections protect a
certain action or condition against state interference, they may
not permit a claimant to choose to pursue an opposite action
or condition. For example, the seventh amendment protects
common law suitors with twenty dollars at stake from governmental deprivation of the "right of trial by jury." The amendment does not guarantee suitors the option not to have a jury
trial; it would permit the government to require jury trials in
all cases. 6 The fourth amendment "right to be secure . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures" does not protect
7
an eccentric interest in a condition of insecurity.
Because they protect choice, freedoms produce by their
very nature greater unpredictability than do other constitutional protections. For example, granting children the freedom
to vote would entail the unique and unpredictable cost of
introducing a largely irrational influence into the electoral process. By contrast, although extending the ban against unreasonable searches and seizures to incompetents would involve
social costs, the incompetence of some of those thereby protected would not impose any special costs.
The elements of choice and unpredictability create obvious
difficulties for the ascription of liberties to individuals incapable of making rational choices. The reason is that the rationales thought to justify protection of the various constitutional freedoms presuppose that the claimant can make
rational decisions that will not result in significant social or
individual harm. The Supreme Court has said that freedom
of speech is guaranteed, in part, to achieve the goal of pro' Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (ig6i). To a great degree, the freedom to be
irreligious is independently secured by the establishment clause. Freedom of the press
similarly protects the freedom not to publish as well as the freedom to publish. See
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). But see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (x969) (government permitted to require radio
and television stations to give time for political replies).
s See cases cited note i9 infra; p. 176o infra.
6 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959); see Propeller

Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 459-6o (185I); Thermo-Stitch,
Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. x96i). But see
Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1176-78 (ig6x).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. By the same token, the fifth amendment protection
against double jeopardy has not been understood to permit the defendant to demand
double jeopardy. The eighth amendment guarantees that the state will not inflict
"cruel and unusual punishments," but it does not oblige the state to provide such
treatment to the masochist who would demand it.
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tecting "the free discussion of governmental affairs."'8 That
protection in turn rests on two principles. First, the speaker
has a right to participate in decisions that affect him. 9 Second,
the public deserves unrestricted access to information so that
decisions arrived at democratically will be made intelligently.1 0
Both principles, however, make certain assumptions about the
characteristics of the speaker. The first assumes a moral and
rational being capable of self-government, an ability that voting laws do not attribute to children1 1 or to the mentally
disabled. 12 The second, though imposing no explicit limitations on the character of the speaker, at least supposes that
his speech might possibly assist democratic decisionmaking;
one who is severely retarded will only rarely offer such assistance.
The other principal reason for the guarantee of freedom of
speech is its intrinsic value "as a means of self-expression, selfrealization, and self-fulfillment." 13 It might seem contradictory for society to sanctify the speaker's autonomy while at the
same time evaluating his competence in order to determine
whether he has a right to speak. But I doubt that we really
believe the two are incompatible. We let adults utter obscenities,1 4 but we don't let children hear them,15 however satisfying the exchange might be to both in their separate ways.
The reason is that we recognize a right to autonomy only for
persons within a certain range, a range defined by the ability
to make rational choices about how one's self ought to be
expressed, realized, and fulfilled. 16 Thus, as the individual's
capacity for moral and rational choice diminishes, state action
restricting speech is less likely to be seen as a restraint on
freedom.
The constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion
presents a similar set of problems. It is nearly a matter of

8 First

Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) (quoting Mills v.

Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (i966)).

9 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (i970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM (ig6o).
10 See,

e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978).

See

generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9.
'" See A. SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 236-37 (1977) (voting age

for state elections); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (reducing voting age to i8).
12 See Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 164447 (1979). See generally J. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 504-I2.
13 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
See also id. at 777 n.i2 (opinion of the Court).
14

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. I5 (I971).

'5 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
16 See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978).

supra note 2, at 243-51, 504-12.

See generally J. RAWLS,
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definition that religious faith is not the product of a strictly
"rational" choice. But that is not to say that, because the
protected choice may not be wholly rational, persons incapable
of rational choice may lay equal claim to the guaranteed freedom. The requirements that protected religious activity be
"based . . . upon a faith to which all else is subordinate or
upon which all else is ultimately dependent" 17 and be "intimately related to daily living" 18 take for granted that claimants
are capable of ordering life's important concerns and acting
consistently with their convictions. The qualities of experience, judgment, and moral conviction that govern those
choices are not ones that we attribute, say, to young children.
What I have said about first amendment freedoms applies
as well to the substantive protections of the due process and
equal protection clauses. An aspect of due process "liberty"
that currently receives vigorous judicial protection is the freedom to make one's own decisions about procreation without
state interference, unless the state has a compelling reason to
intervene and avoids unnecessary restrictions. The protected
choices most often litigated have been those pertaining to abortions and contraception. The individual interest at stake though sometimes styled a right of "privacy" - is in fact an
interest in autonomous resolution of one of life's most important questions. 19 If the purpose of the due process clause is
to insulate that interest, though, it does not apply straightforwardly to tinkering by the state with the reproductive decisions
of persons incapable of moral and rational choice. For all of
Bellotti v. Baird's talk about the child's right to "seek" an
abortion, 20 five members of the Court agreed that the state
could prevent an immature minor from making that decision
- four by committing the
choice to a court, one by committing
21
it to the child's parents.
17 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).

18 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205, 216 (1972).
19Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) (plurality opinion in relevant part); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-60o & n.26 (I977).
20 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642, 647, 648 (,979) (plurality opinion).
21 Justice Powell's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart

and Rehnquist, explicitly recognized that "minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."

443 U.S. at 635. The Justices held that the state, if it has a parental consent
requirement, must provide an alternate procedure so that minors can still obtain an
abortion if the minor proves herself mature or shows that an abortion is in her best
interests. Court approval would be one such constitutionally permissible alternate
procedure. Id. at 642-44. Justice White would have upheld a requirement of parental
consent. Id. at 656-57 (dissenting opinion).
In considering access to contraceptives, the Supreme Court has also looked to the
characteristics of the individual. Although Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
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Closely related to the due process liberty of procreative
autonomy is the fundamental equal protection freedom to

marry. 2 2 That right is withheld from both minors 23 and the
mentally incompetent 24 because they lack the full capacity for

individual choice -

and freedom of choice is at the heart of

the right to marry. 25 So too with the right to vote. We permit
the imposition of age and competence restrictions because the
freedom at stake presupposes that one claiming it has the
' 26
"ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."

It could hardly be otherwise, since ultimately the ballot functions as a means of self-government, an activity
difficult for
27
those incapable of moral and rational choice.
678 ('977), held that children had a right to acquire contraceptives, Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion assumed that "the Constitution does not bar state regulation of the
sexual behavior of minors." Id. at 694 n.I7 (plurality opinion in relevant part). Thus,
it is difficult to say that the child has any freedom to make decisions about procreation.
However questionable its conclusions may be for other reasons, Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 207 (1927), suggests the importance of the ability to choose for decisions
about the propriety of involuntary sterilization. See also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,
426 A.2d 467 (r98I) (upholding involuntary sterilization statute, giving as one reason
the inability of incompetents to choose).
22 Although the Supreme Court considered the right to marry only under the equal
protection clause, it seems likely that it also qualifies as a substantive due process
interest. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. I, 12 (1967).
23 See

M.

PAULSEN,

W.

WADLINGTON

& J.

GOEBEL, DOMESTIC

RELATIONS

I16-28 (2d ed. 1974).
24 See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 240-43
(rev. ed. 1971).
2S See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978).
26

Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (wealth not a

permissible restriction for voting because not germane to ability to participate intelligently).
27 By contrast with freedoms, other constitutional rights are justified in ways that
say little about the character of the person claiming the right. Consider, for example,
the procedural protections afforded by the fifth and 14th amendments in adjudication
of property interests. Most of us would agree that someone mentally ill or in a coma
is entitled to due process protection against the seizure of his property. The courts
seem to concur. See Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 2361 (E.D. Pa. 2974),
aff'd, 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (2977); McConaghley v. City
of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 236 (2969). Part of the reason is that
we define interests in property without reference to any characteristics of the owner;
a three-year-old can own land in fee simple just as an adult can. Procedural protections can also be justified without reference to individual traits; they ensure accuracy
in decisions about the disposition of property. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
97 (1972). One might approach the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil
cases in the same way: It is designed to assure a fair determination of disputed facts,
something to which even one in a coma is entitled, provided he has $20 at stake.
Even in its nonsubstantive aspects, the equal protection clause necessarily entails
some attention to the characteristics of the rights-claimant, because it requires only
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Any argument, then, that incompetents are entitled to
claim constitutional freedoms encounters two serious obstacles,
one practical and one theoretical. The first is the unpredictable
social and- individual consequences that may result from the
exercise of irrational choice; the second is the difficulty of
explaining why we should ascribe, to those unable to choose,
liberties that are valued because of the protection they offer
for choice. Despite these problems, I believe it is nonetheless
possible to ascribe constitutional freedoms to persons with a
diminished capacity for choice. In the next four Parts, I explore a number of theories to justify such an ascription. The
first conception, which I call laissez faire, argues from premises
of human dignity or of utility that we should in all cases show
the same concern and respect for children, the retarded, and
so on, as we would for fully competent adults. A second
possibility is an instrumental one - to value freedoms not
because they are intrinsically valuable but because they contribute to some other interest of the incompetent. A third
approach, which relies on surrogate choices, assumes that freedoms are important even to one who has no concern for them,
if those who care for him value freedoms on his behalf. Finally, for those lacking a surrogate to make such choices for
them, we must proceed on the premise that the state has a
duty to act in their interests as would a surrogate. I state
these theories in increasing order of intrusiveness into the individual's life, and I shall argue that judges and legislators
should consider them in series to settle on the least intrusive
means of control.

T-I.

THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH TO FREEDOM

A. Laissez Faire as an Absolute Principle
Among the arguments for securing liberty for all individuals regardless of age or capacity for choice, the most protecthat those similar in relevant respects be treated alike. See generally Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (I949). But the
relevant individual characteristics normally do not include the ability to make choices.
In equal protection cases involving children, the question is typically whether one
group of children, defined by race or circumstances of birth, should be treated like
another class of children, not like mature adults. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1978) (illegitimacy); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (x977) (same); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (same); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494
(i954) (race).
The ban on cruel and unusual punishment also requires some attention to the
character of the person claiming its protection, but the capacity for rational choice is
not a relevant characteristic. All that is presupposed is a human being who is sentient
and capable of suffering.
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five is laissez faire. By that term I mean to designate an
ideology holding that everyone should be entitled to all freedoms in equal measure. In one form, the laissez-faire argument derives from the "premise of individual dignity" 28 the
conclusion that freedom is an end in itself: "To be able to
choose is a good that is independent of the wisdom of what is
chosen."'29 Because of this heedlessness of consequences, the
laissez-faire position based on individual dignity needs no special rules for those unable to choose wisely. If choice is an
intrinsic good, then even the youngest child, who is bound to
make foolish choices, should be entitled to claim constitutional
freedoms.
The application of this view to those, such as children,
without a full capacity for rational choice has a legitimate
judicial pedigree. For example, one crucial premise in Justice
Fortas' opinion upholding the free speech rights of children in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 30 was that "[s]tudents in school as well as out of school
are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
' 31
themselves must respect their obligations to the State."
Other instances may be found in a number of early cases
32
dealing with the abortion rights of minors. State v. Koome
is illustrative. In striking down a state law requiring parental
consent to abortions performed on unmarried minors under
eighteen, the Washington Supreme Court began with the assumption that, "[p]rima facie, the constitutional rights of minors, including the right of privacy, are coextensive with those
33
of adults."

28
29

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (i971).
Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAw io7,

117 (R.

Wasserstrom

ed. 1971).
30 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31Id. at 511. But cf. id. at 515 (Stewart, J.,concurring) (first amendment rights

of children are not coextensive with those of adults).
32 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 26o (1975).
33 Id. at 904, 530 P.2d at 263; see Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947, 953-54
(D. Colo. i975); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2973), direct
appeal dismissed and cert. denied per curiam, 4,7 U.S. 279 (1974), and'affd, 5,7

F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Pilpel & Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors, 23
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 779, 795-804 (1972). Koome's "prima facie equality" between
adults and children is cast in doubt by other language in the opinion. After the
statement quoted in text, the court went on to say that, when minors' rights have
been held more limited than those of adults, "it has been because some peculiar state
interest existed in the regulation and protection of children, not because the rights
themselves are of some inferior kind." 84 Wash. 2d at 904, 530 P.2d at 263. But

rights that children need to be protected against exercising hardly qualify as rights.
See p. 1781 infra.
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The laissez-faire position based on individual dignity does
present an internally consistent claim on behalf of equal liberty
for all, but it is both unjust and impractical. Its key assumption is that children, the mentally deficient, and other legal
incompetents have the same claim to "individual dignity" as
competent adults. The most obvious problem with this assumption is that few of us are willing to make it. We are not,
for example, willing to allow a child the freedom to roam at
will at the cost of having him run down by a car. In fact, my
child has a private right, enforceable under the neglect statutes, to my restricting his freedom to wander in the street. By
the same token, the state would act unjustly if it did not
restrict the sale of liquor or airplane glue to six-year-olds.
These examples are extreme, but they make the point that we
hardly go all out as a society for every proposition that a strict
principle of human dignity would entail. Compulsory education violates such principles, as does the civil commitment of
a retarded person who would otherwise starve in the street.
A weaker version of the laissez-faire argument, which has
its genesis in the ideas of Herbert Spencer, is essentially utilitarian. It sees human happiness as the ultimate goal and
34
liberty of action as a means of producing that happiness.
Like the version based on human dignity, the utilitarian position holds that people can claim the benefits of liberty without regard to their capacity for choice. People may differ
greatly in their ability to enjoy the benefits of freedom, but a
child and an adult can both be free in the same way a shotglass
and a tumbler can both be full. On this view there is no
justification for permitting greater state interference with a
child's freedom of speech, for example, than with an adult's.
The utilitarian affirmation of laissez faire as a means as
well as an end is illustrated by Justice Brandeis' concurrence
in Whitney v. California:35 "Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free
to develop their faculties ....
They valued liberty both as an
end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty." Cases such
as Cohen v. California,36 Roe v. Wade, 37 and Stanley v. Georgia38 contain similar intimations that freedom of choice is
valued for its contribution to individual happiness. 39
34 H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 154 (Robert Schalkenbach Foundation ed. 1974)
1872). See also J. MIILL, supra note 6, at Io, 12, 74.

(Ist ed.

35 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
36 403 U.S. I5 ('97r).
37 410 U.S. 113 (i973).

38 394 U.S. 557 (I969).
39 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24; Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564
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This utilitarian approach is plainly untenable as an argument for full recognition of liberty for incompetents. 40 It founders on the unwarranted assumption that, for such a person,
freedom necessarily produces happiness. If that is not so,
liberty loses some of its utilitarian appeal and may yield to
other means of achieving the desired end. And, of course,
freedom does not always produce happiness. If I allow my
three-year-old to play ball outside by himself, he is free to
exercise his faculties, but it's a good bet that sooner or later
he will chase his ball into the street and be run over. Because
he lacks judgment, patience, and a working knowledge of
Newton's laws, I have little doubt that his long-term happiness
will be best assured if I forbid him to play near cars. The
same might be said for a city ordinance forbidding him to play
in the street at night.
B. Laissez Faire as a Limiting Principle
Nevertheless, whether based on dignity or utility, laissezfaire ideology currently plays an important and useful role in
constitutional law. Although we may not favor universal application of the principle, laissez faire does work to broaden
our idea of who is entitled to enjoy constitutional liberties.
One illustration is the rule concerning the abortion rights of
mature minors that emerges from Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth4 ' and Bellotti v. Baird.4 2 Together, those cases indicate
that, because some minors under eighteen are able to make
rational choices about the desirability of an abortion, a state
may not require all pregnant females under that age to secure
parental permission or a court order before seeking an abortion. Instead, if the state wishes to act, it must inquire in
each case whether the minor is mature enough to make the
decision on her own, and if she is, it may not interfere with
her choice even though a judge believes that it is not in her
best interests. 43 A second example is the frequent suggestion
that a mere showing of mental illness is not enough to justify
involuntary civil commitment. Because mental illness may
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
40 See L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 49 n.i (ig8o); Schrag, The

Child in the Moral Order, 52 PHILOSOPHY 167 ('977).
41 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
42 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).

43 This point remains open to question in light of Justice Stevens' separate concurrence in Bellotti, id. at 652-56. He objected to permitting a judge to make the
decision, but whether he would balk in the case of an immature minor was not clear.
Justice White, who dissented, seemed willing to go along with a court's decision,
provided the parents could participate. Id. at 657.
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take many different forms and does not necessarily entail incompetence to make decisions about the need for treatment,
a more particularized finding of incapacity should be required
44
if a commitment statute is to comport with due process.
Much the same is often said about the right of mental patients
to refuse treatment. 45 For similar reasons, blanket disqualifications of mentally disabled persons from voting 46 and from
marriage 4 7 have been criticized as unconstitutionally overbroad.
Courts in these cases accept the notion that freedom to
undertake a particular course of conduct may be less meaningful for one with diminished capacity for choice. Nevertheless, they try to ensure that the state does not use unjustified
presumptions to enlarge the class of individuals considered
unable to choose. In short, they seek to maximize the reach
of laissez faire so that the principle is used whenever practicable. Of course, in some cases the courts will tolerate blanket
denials of freedom to those of diminished capacity. 48 Case-by44 See, e.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 41x F. Supp. 1113, 1124-25 (D. Hawaii 1976);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. i974). See also O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (I975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078, 2094 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court) (dictum), vacated on
other grounds and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (i974); Dix, Hospitalizationof the Mentally
Ill in Wisconsin: A Needfor Reexamination, 5I MARQUETTE L. REV. 1 (1967); Siegel,
The Justificationsfor Medical Commitment - Real or Illusory, 6 WAKE FOREST
INTRA. L. REv. 22, 29-33 (i969); Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 190, 122-19
(974) [hereinafter cited as Developments - Civil Commitment]; Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 822, 826-32 (1967); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1295 (1966).
45 See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Knecht v. Gillman,
488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 2973); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461, 496 (2977).
46 Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 2644, 1656-59
(1979). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-564(a) (1973); R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & H.
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 364-67 (1968); Klein
& Grossman, Voting Competence and Mental Illness, 3 PROC. 76TH ANN. CONVENTION AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N 701, 702 (1968). For examples of cases reaching
the same conclusion on nonconstitutional grounds, see Boyd v. Board of Registrars
of Voters, 368 Mass. 631, 334 N.E.2d 629 (975); Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super.
439, 354 A.2d 355 (1976). See also Project, The Administration of PsychiatricJustice:
Theory and Practicein Arizona, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. I, 91-96 (1971).
47 Shaman, Persons Who Are Mentally Retarded. Their Right to Marry and Have
Children, 12 FAM. L.Q. 61 (1978); Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in THE
MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 6-9 (M. Kindred ed. 2976); Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 156,
1259-61 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments - The Constitution and the Fantily].
48 E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (right to buy pornography);
see U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (right to vote); cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4102 (West
Supp. 1979) (right to marry).
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case adjudication about claims to everything from obscene
books to voting has a certain pious appeal, but it would be
awfully expensive and might well produce arbitrary results.
The decision whether an individual is sufficiently rational,
mature, and experienced to make up her own mind about
whether to have an abortion or get married is not one that
judges are especially well equipped to make. 4 9 Consequently,
before jettisoning general rules, the courts ask what precisely
is the individual harm from a categorical approach, and also
how important it is to have a general rule at all. 5 0 It is easy
to see by almost any measure of individual harm why we
might want case-by-case determinations of maturity when the
issue is abortion, but not when it is the right to buy pornography. A young woman denied the choice to have an abortion
may suffer an impairment far more serious, 5 1 permanent, and
total than will one merely prevented from purchasing pornographic books. The factor of permanence also helps explain
why marriage and voting rights are more frequently championed for the mentally disabled, for whom any denial may be
long term, than for minors, who in any case will have both
rights in a few years.
Although methods other than laissez faire may be used to
attribute freedoms to those who are not rational adults, the
use of the limiting principle just discussed shows that the
courts prefer a laissez-faire approach whenever possible. This
preference suggests that laissez faire is our primary conception
of liberty, greater deviations from which require correspondingly greater justification. Moreover, the rule of autonomous
choice is easier to apply than the rules discussed below, which
at times require courts to decide what will be most likely to
enhance an individual's welfare. Society benefits when its
courts are not forced to make such difficult and time-consuming choices.

49 See Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on
the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 796-804 (1978); Goldstein,
Medical Carefor the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of ParentalAutonomy, 86
YALE L.J. 645, 65o, 663 (i977).

5o For discussion of the "flexible balancing" approach to substantive due process
and the equal protection clause, see Developments - The Constitutionand the Family,
supra note 47, at 1193-97; Note, Equal Protection and Due Process: Contrasting
Methods of Review Under FourteenthAmendment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 529, 537-41, 548-54, 561-65 (,979).

51 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.

622, 642,

643

n.23

(1979) (opinion of Powell,
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AN INSTRUMENTAL CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM

If liberty involves the making of rational choices, its intelligent exercise demands practice. This idea is at the core of
one way of justifying liberty for those whom the justifications
for laissez faire do not reach. According to this instrumental
conception, the right to freedom may depend on the ability to
choose, but acquiring the ability to choose also depends on the
exercise of freedom. We can thus justify the ascription of
freedoms to one presently without the capacity for choice because the individual's development into a mature and healthy
person depends in large measure on the prior recognition of
liberties. Using freedom of speech as an example, I begin by
showing that such a view of liberty is really something different from our conventional understanding of the term. I then
illustrate what an instrumental view of free speech might mean
for children 5 2 and the mentally ill. Finally, I suggest a few
other applications of the instrumental conception and sketch
some of its limitations.
A. The Need for an Instrumental Conception:
Freedom of Speech
Over nearly the whole range of "speech" activities, the
courts have imposed paternalistic restraints on the free speech
of children in order to advance their health, education, and
morals. S3 A minor's freedom to peddle even religious ideas
may be limited in order to avoid "emotional excitement and
psychological or physical injury."'5 4 The child's right of access
to ideas, at least those that are vulgar or pornographic, can
be specially limited because a state might rationally conclude
that such matter impairs the child's "ethical and moral devel52

For a more extended discussion, see Garvey, Children and the FirstAmendment,

57 TEX. L. REV. 321 (I979).
53 Children are treated precisely the same as adults only in the area of coerced
speech. Compare West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 329 U.S. 624 (I943), with
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
54 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. I58, 170 (1944). Sarah Prince was convicted
of giving to her nine-year-old niece, and allowing her to sell, copies of Watchtower
and Consolation, two publications of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in violation of § 8o and
§ 8I of the Massachusetts child labor law. Those sections were provided to enforce
the prohibitions of § 69, which stated: "No boy under twelve and no girl under
eighteen shall sell, expose or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or
any other articles of merchandise... in any street or public place." But Prince might
well be exonerated today if § 69 violated the free speech or free exercise rights of her
niece. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 & n.6 (1972); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
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Such cases permit states to "protect" children by

preventing them from doing things adults have a constitutional
right to do. 5 6 Perhaps the most severe imposition on the child's

right of free expression is made in the interest of education:
the requirement that youngsters hear what the state seeks to

communicate through its compulsory school system. Although
there is no serious question about the propriety of the govern57

ment using this means to inculcate values in the young,

it

would be a massive infringement of the first amendment for

the state to herd adults
together and propagandize them for
8
5
seven hours a day.

Parallel paternalistic limitations on freedom of expression
exist in the institutional mental health system.

Although the

logistics of running a large institution obviously necessitate
some restrictions,

9

in many cases the restraint is justified pri-

marily in terms of the patient's own interests.

Statutes fre-

quently permit censorship of incoming mail to promote the

patient's welfare 60 or to control the receipt of possibly harmful
substances. 6 1 Similarly paternalistic reasons are given for per-

mitting qualification of visitation privileges, even when it is
unnecessary to protect the interests of others. 62 Even the
availability of writing materials, though guaranteed in some
55 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (I968) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law 484e (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.20-.22 (McKinney 198o))); see FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (vulgarity).
56 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634-35; Prince, 321 U.S. at 167-68.
57 See Goldstein, The Asserted ConstitutionalRight of Public School Teachers to
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1350-51 (1976).
s8 Cf. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (the right to privacy should prevent a regulated streetcar company from
forcing "the streetcar captive audience" to listen to certain radio broadcasts). See
generally T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 710-X2.
59 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §122-55.2(b)(2) (i98i); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY

ILL § 21(a)(2) & Commentary (Public Health Service Publication No. 5i, rev. Sept.
1952) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT ACT].
60 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.I5o(a)(I) (i979); S.C. CODE § 44-23-1030(1) (1976);
DRAFT ACT, supra note 59, § 21(a)(I); cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373,
379--80 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (patient in mental institution should have right to receive
sealed mail unless personnel responsible for patient's treatment impose special restrictions), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also S.
BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 24, at 156-57.
61 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 3 9 4 -4 5 9(5)(b) (Supp. i98o); GA. CODE § 88-502.7(c)
(r978).
62 See ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Ill: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87 th Cong., ist Sess.
343 (ig6i) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2o6h(a), (d)
(West ig8i); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2g(I) (West I98i); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I8,
§ 7705(a)(2) (1968). See also Brakel, Legal Problems of People in Mental and
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states by statute, 63 may be restricted to prevent injuries from
pens or pencils."
Both courts and commentators often suggest that the interest of the state as parens patriae in restricting the freedom
of incompetents is weighed against a right to free speech that
is equal in scope whether the claimant is a child, a mentally
ill person, or a healthy adult. 65 That conception is misguided.
Far from simply overriding an incompetent individual's freedom, we implicitly deny the freedom of incompetents when
we impose paternalistic restraints upon them. The point is
made clear if one compares the reasons for limiting the free
speech of adults with the paternalistic reasons for limiting the
rights of incompetents. For adults, we override free speech
rights only when necessary to give equal respect to the dignity
of other persons, and not simply to protect the would-be
speaker from harming himself. Thus, for fully competent persons, freedom to speak can be outweighed only by conflicting
claims of other individuals (libel, fraud, invasion of privacy,
fighting words) or by social necessities that interfere neutrally
and minimally with expression (no sound trucks, no parades
during rush hour) or are sufficiently compelling to overwhelm
speech rights (subversive advocacy). 66 There is an essential
difference between these countervailing individual rights and
social necessities, on the one hand, and paternalistic restraints
on the other: The latter are inconsistent with the ideas of
Penal Institutions: An Exploratory Study, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J.
565, 592.
A less justifiable practice than those noted above is censorship of outgoing mail in
order to prevent the patient from transmitting inaccurate or indecent information.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.459(5)(a) (Supp. z98o); WYO. STAT. § 25-3-124a(I) (x977);

DRAFT ACT, supra note 59, § 21(a)(x). Nebraska provides that letters will not be
mailed if reasonably believed to be threatening or if the recipient asks in writing not
to have them sent. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-314 (1976).
63 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325(e) (West Supp. 1981); MINN.
STAT. § 253A.17.4 (1980).
64 See Hearings, supra note 62, at 134 (statement of Hon. John Biggs, Jr.).
65 Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 430 (D. Utah 1979);
State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 9o,

530 P.2d 260 (I975); Developments -

The Con-

stitution and the Family, supra note 47, at 1358-64. See also Trachtman v. Anker,
563 F.2d 512, 519-20 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); B. ENNIS &
R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 154 (1978); Note, First Amendment

Limitations on the Power of School Boards to Select and Remove High School Text
and Library Books, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 457, 471 n.83 (1978).
66 See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 12 (1978).

The

one exception is the treatment of obscenity, the justification for which appears paternalistic. But even obscenity regulation is defended to some degree on the basis of the
rights of other individuals (prevention of sex crimes) and social concerns (effect on the
quality of life). See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-63 (1973).
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human dignity and political equality that are the basis for
conventional theories of rights. 67 Paternalistic restrictions can
be justified only on the assumption that the state is best able
to choose on the individual's behalf, that is to say, only on the
assumption that the individual's choice in the matter in question is not entitled to the same respect, and to the same
constitutional protection, as the preference that the majority
establishes for him.
B. An Instrumental Justificationfor Freedom of Speech
If freedom of speech has to be justified in more restrictive
terms for children and the mentally ill, what warrants attributing it to them at all, and what form would it take? Earlier
I noted that we value freedom of speech because of its contribution to self-government and to self-expression. In this Section, I consider the ways in which permitting incompetent
persons to exercise freedom of speech might advance those
goals.
i. Self-Government. - One part of the instrumental justification of freedom of speech for children is that liberty assists
their development into mature adults capable of democratic
self-government. 68 The Supreme Court has clearly endorsed
this view in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.69 Tinker held that high school and junior
high school students, aged thirteen to sixteen, were deprived
of their freedom of speech when they were suspended for
wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. At first
blush it might seem that this freedom was indistinguishable
from that of their parents: Justice Fortas' opinion for the Court
speaks throughout of "First Amendment rights" 70 in an unqualified way and imputes to the children a desire to influence
71
Ultiothers regarding the formulation of political policy.
mately, though, the Court thought free speech important not
because Washington waited on the outcome of the school's
foreign policy debate, but because free speech played a role in
the students' own development: "The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
67

See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1977).

See generally L.

HOULGATE, supra note 40, at i5-16, 36-37, 42-43.
61 See pp. 1758-59 supra.
69 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
70 Id. at 5o6, 507; cf. id. at 511 ("Students ...are 'persons' under our Constitution.

They are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect .....
71 Id. at 514.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1772

[Vol. 94:1756

tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." 72
The primarily instrumental character of the child's free
speech rights means that these rights need not be protected as
zealously as those of adults. For example, prior restraints
have long been seen as the cardinal sin against adult freedom
of speech, in part because "[i]t is vital to the operation of
democratic government that the citizens have facts and ideas
on important issues before them. A delay of even a day or
two may be of crucial importance in some instances."' 7 3 Such
restrictions are widely accepted when imposed on school newspapers, though; the justification demanded is nothing more
compelling than a reasonable likelihood of disruption to school
processes.7 4 The explanation is surely that the significance of
student expression in ensuring the right outcome counts for far
less than it would in the adult world, and the instrumental
value of immediate publication - the educational benefits that
are lost when restraint or prepublication review is allowed
- is outweighed by the 7significance
of the pedagogical process
5
that might be disrupted.
A similar instrumental analysis of the relation of free speech
to self-government is applicable to the mentally ill. Within
the miniature society of the institution, the patient's role, like
the child's within the school system, is more passive than
active. The one striking exception to that passivity is the
active role encouraged by the law for the patient in his efforts
to expose wrongful confinement. Statutes in nearly all states
72

Id. at

512

(emphasis added) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.

589, 603 (1967)); see West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637,
641 (1943); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 96o, 972-73 (5th Cir.
1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 197).
73 Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968)
(quoting A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
74 Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Jacobs v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 49o F.2d 6oi, 6o9 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot per curiam, 420 U.S.
128 (1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v.
Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd.
of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 46o F.2d X355 (7th Cir.
1972) (prior restraints per se unconstitutional).
75 Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (2969) (adults may be sanctioned after the fact only for advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action" and "likely to incite or produce such action"), with Karp v. Becken,
477 F.2d IM7, 176 ( 9th Cir. 1973) (student expression may be prohibited if there is
"reasonable forecast" of disruption), and Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th
Cir. 1972) (same), and Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (same), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (i97i).
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permit unrestricted communication with specified officials, the
committing court, or a central mental health agency, 76 and in
many cases with lawyers as well. 77 The issue is not litigated
as frequently as one would suppose, because claims by the
mentally ill have generally been based on grounds other than
free speech. 78 There are, however, occasional indications that
such limited communication privileges are all the first amend-

ment demands. 79 To the extent to which this is true, freedom
of speech for the institutionalized is important not because the
mentally ill govern themselves -

they don't 8° -

but because

as an ally of habeas corpus it may assist their readmission into
the community of those who do.
2.

Self-Realization. -

The second significant value attri-

buted to freedom of speech in the adult model is the key role
it plays in the process by which an individual defines himself.

This position is less plausible with regard to children, 8 1 since
76 ME. REV. STAT.

ANN. tit. 34, §

2254.1 (1978); PA. STAT.

ANN. it. 50, § 4423(I)

(Purdon r969); VT. STAT. ANN. it. I8, § 7705(b) (1968); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.6I(I)(c) (West Supp. i98o). Somewhat dated tabulations may be found in S.
BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 24, at 174-79; Note, The Committed Mentally Ill
and Their Right to Communicate, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297, 307-1i (I97i).
77 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(8) (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-17IC (West
Supp. i98o); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2g(I) (West I98I).
7' Most cases affirming the existence of the right base it on some right other than
the first amendment, such as the right of habeas corpus, see Hoff v. State, 279 N.Y.
490, I8 N.E.2d 671 (1939); People ex rel. Jacobs v. Worthing, 167 Misc. 702, 4
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1938); In re Weightman's Estate, i26 Pa. Super. 221, i9o A. 552
(1937), on a common law right against false imprisonment, see Stowers v. Wolodzko,
386 Mich. 11g, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971), aff'g Stowers v. Ardmore Acres Hosp., 19
Mich. App. I15, 172 N.W.2d 497 (1969) (private hospital), or on some statutory right
against interference with communications with counsel, see In re Hofmann, 13l Cal.
App. 2d 758, 281 P.2d 96 (I955); cf. Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (suit against physician for allegedly monitoring telephone conversations
in violation of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 802 (currently
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (976)). See also cases cited in Hearings, supra note 62,
at 343 n.ix5.
79 Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc. 2d I63, I73-74, 317 N.Y.S.2d 128, 139 (1970),
modified, 36 A.D.2d 926, 321 N.Y.S.2d 6i (197i), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d
615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972); cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373, 379-80 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (unrestricted right to send sealed mail;
unrestricted right to receive sealed mail from attorneys, private physicians, mental
health professionals, courts, and government officials). See also Brown v. Schubert,
347 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (apparently broader affirmation of the right
to communicate by mail), supplemented, 389 F. Supp. 281, 283-84 (E.D. Wis. 975).
so A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 84-85.
81 However, the position is frequently taken on their behalf. See, e.g., ABA &
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT,
STANDARDS RELATING TO RIGHTS OF MINORS 119-22 (tent. draft I977); Letwin,

Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public School Campuses in California, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 41, 197-205 (I974); Tushnet, Free Expression and the Young
Adult: A ConstitutionalFramework, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 746, 76o; Project, Education
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they can hardly be expected to develop their natural capacities
in a socially acceptable fashion when allowed to act without
interference. Therefore, we are willing to impose significant
limitations on the freedom of children to express themselves.
We do not want to risk having too many people grow up to
define themselves as liars or bigots; as a society we are not
above bending the twig a little, though we won't tamper with
the tree. 8 2 But this does not mean that, for anyone not a fully
competent adult, freedom of expression is completely subordinate to some social blueprint for the ideal citizen. Instead,
we permit children to express themselves - within limits with the instrumental hope that they will grow up able to
appreciate the intrinsic satisfactions of self-expression. Society
has an interest in encouraging autonomy and diversity, and
freedom of speech for children serves several values important
to that end.8 3 Courts often note the value of freedom in
teaching children the satisfactions that can result from expression of their own individuality;8 4 in ensuring the developmental of skills used for rational discourse; 85 in instilling an
appreciation of how speech can affect, assist, and injure others;
and in providing for the receipt of information important to
the child's development.
An illustration of how these values are implemented is the
treatment of racial insults in schools. Though face-to-face
racial slurs could probably be forbidden for both adults and
children, 8 6 courts have tolerated restrictions even on wearing
Confederate flags in the interest of avoiding racial disputes in
the schools.8 7 Such control, greater than anything we would
and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1460
(1976); Comment, Public Secondary Education:JudicialProtection of Student Individuality, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 126, 141 (I969).
82 See J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION chs. 7-9 (i916).
3 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-12
(i969); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
84 This may explain the emphasis in Tinker on the importance of individuality.
393 U.S. at 5iI. Notice also the rejection in Barnette of "national unity" as a warrant
to force school children to salute the flag. 319 U.S. at 64o-42.
85 See J. MILL, supra note I6, at 35.
86 T. EMERSON, supra note 9, at 326; Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evot
lution of FirstAmendment Protection, 9 HAiV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. x, 27 (1974); cf.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (I942) (upholding statute prohibiting
public name-calling); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTI-

TUTIONAL LAW 793 (1978).
87 See, e.g., Augustus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975); Melton v.
Young, 465 F.2d 2332 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 951 (1973). But see
Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 2972); Banks v. Muncie Community
Schools, 433 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 197o). The Juvenile Justice Standards promulgated
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permit over adults, is prompted by the greater sensitivity of
children to racial disparagement. But it can only be tolerated
if we see the self-realization functions served by the speech of
children as instrumental rather than intrinsic. Consider the
first of those instrumental values: teaching children the satisfaction that can result from expressions of individuality. Expression of racial discrimination doubtless serves that end, in a
perverse fashion, but precisely because it is perverse, we regulate children's speech, lest they develop into adults who define
themselves as racists. With regard to the second and third of
the functions served by the child's free speech right - the
development of skills and of an appreciation of the impact of
speech on others - it makes sense to conclude that those are
lessons that may be learned another time when the conse88
quences for the listener are not as severe.
As with children, recovery of a healthy personality in the
case of the mentally ill does not necessarily occur without
regulation. That being so, the individual's self-definition or
realization through expression or receipt of information may
play only an instrumental role in the patient's recovery, rather
than be assigned an ultimate value as a good in itself. Thus,
the statutes of most states provide that the communication and
visitation rights of patients may be restricted "for the medical
'8 9
welfare of the patient."
Some of the instrumental purposes served by granting freedom of speech to children are already fulfilled in the case of
the institutionalized mentally ill, whose language skills are
more likely to be well developed. Free speech rights can
nonetheless serve an important instrumental function in aiding
the eventual readaptation of the mentally ill individual to
society. The principle of normalization espoused by such cases
as Wyatt v. Stickney9" builds on the perception that the total
by the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association would
permit restriction of student expression that "advocates racial, religious, or ethnic
prejudice or discrimination or seriously disparages particular racial, religious, or ethnic
groups." ABA & INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION Standard 4 .2C, at
84 (tent. draft 1977).

s8A second illustration of the difference between the adult's and the child's freedom
of speech in the process of self-realization is provided by cases establishing variable
standards for obscenity, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and
vulgarity, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 483 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978). Regulations
like these do not affect the development of the speaker's skill, but rather curtail the
receipt of information that is important to the recipient for one reason or another.
89 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.I5o(a)(i), (2) (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§

17-

2o6g(c), 17-2o6h(d), (f) (West x98i); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25 3 A.I7.5-.6 (West 1971);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. i8, § 77o5(a)(I), (2) (1968); DRAFT ACT, supra note 59, § 2I.
90 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
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control exercised by an institution over its inmates fosters a
dependence that is itself an obstacle to social readjustment.9 1
The surest means of avoiding such institutional dependence is
to grant the patient the greatest possible autonomy consistent
with the purposes of commitment.
C. Applications and Limitations of the Instrumental View of
Freedom
Having discussed freedom of speech, I want to say a word
about the application of the instrumental approach to other
freedoms. Issues of freedom of association, assembly, and
movement arise when the visitation rights of the institutionalized mentally ill or retarded are limited, and indeed when
such individuals are institutionalized in the first place. 92 The
same liberties are implicated by juvenile curfew ordinances.
Many of these questions can be approached in the manner I
have outlined above. Consider juvenile curfews. It would
surely be unconstitutional to forbid children to appear on the
streets without a chaperone at any time of day, and would
just as surely be constitutional to require an adult companion
between one and six in the morning. But absent emergency
conditions, both ordinances would be unconstitutional if applied to adults. 93 The difference is that, for children, the
freedoms of association and assembly have less an intrinsic
than an instrumental significance; they can therefore be restricted somewhat because children have other opportunities
to pursue their group objectives. As long as a child has nineteen hours a day to meet with his street gang, his development
is not likely to be significantly impaired by the fact that he
cannot do it all night long. Freedom of the press, the liberty
preeminently involved in cases dealing with the regulation of
underground or official student newspapers, may also be approached in the same instrumental fashion.
F.2d 1305 ( 5 th Cir. 2974); cf. Glenn, The Least Restrictive Alternative in Residential
Care and the Principle of Normalization, in PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 499 (1976) (need to
avoid creating a "deviancy subculture").
91 For a study of the phenomenon of institutional dependence, see E. GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMs 3-73 (Ig6r).
92 See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1158-61 (1972).
93 See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974
(Okla. Crim. App. 2971); City of Portland v. James, 25x Or. 8, 444 P.2d 554 (1968);
City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967).
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However, the instrumental view of freedom is not applicable to all actors of diminished capacity with respect to all
choices. If its essential premise is that freedoms are protected
in order to assist the individual's development into a healthy
adult capable of exercising choice in an unrestricted fashion,
it has little relevance for the attribution of liberties to the
severely retarded, the very senile, or those who are comatose.
A decision about the free speech rights of a severely retarded
adult, for example, must take into account that he may never
be allowed to vote, that he will never derive a full measure of
satisfaction from expression as a means of self-realization, that
he will never fully master the skills of rational discourse nor
appreciate fully how his expression affects others, and that he
is incapable of grasping a good deal of what others are trying
to impart to him.
Moreover, there are some choices that even healthy children or the treatable mentally ill can be permitted to make
only at extreme peril to their long-term development. A decision whether to undertake a painful and hazardous life-saving medical procedure involves consequences far more weighty
than a decision whether to wear a black armband to school,
and the importance of making the choice correctly may far
outweigh the developmental significance of allowing the incompetent individual to make it on his own.
Part I considered and rejected the suggestion that we
apply the laissez-faire conception of freedom across the board
to those of diminished capacity. Nevertheless, it argued that
the laissez-faire idea of freedom serves as a benchmark and
that the justifications for extending freedom become less acceptable as they deviate from that idea. Of the various
grounds for attributing freedoms to incompetent persons, the
instrumental notion deviates least from this benchmark justification. In fact, the instrumental conception just discussed
strongly resembles the utilitarian laissez-faire position - both
share the fundamental assumption that freedom is a means to
a more valuable end. What distinguishes the instrumental
justification is that it assigns a qualified rather than an absolute
value to liberty itself, because it assumes only an imperfect
correlation between freedom and happiness. In part, this skepticism inevitably results from the attempt to be more specific
about the ends to which freedom is a means. It also results
from the realization that for certain actors and for certain
choices, an individual's freedom to choose can actually produce
significant individual and social harm. It is to those cases that
I now turn.
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FREEDOM TO FOLLOW SURROGATE CHOICES

This Part maintains that, in the more difficult cases in
which the individual is too incompetent or the choice too
significant to risk noninterference, an individual should still
have the right to be free from state interference, provided that
his choices can be made by a surrogate decisionmaker who is
sufficiently close to the individual. In Section A, I begin by
exploring the configuration of private rights and duties in the
relation between parent and child. Section B shows how this
matrix of private rights figures in the assertion of rights against
the state. Finally, in Section C, I propose a number of other
applications for the theory of surrogate choices.
A. The Relation Between Claimant and Surrogate
A proper understanding of the child's claim to freedom
against the state must begin with an exploration of the private
rights and duties that exist between parent and child. Only
thus is it possible to see what the state takes away from the
child and whether what is lost might qualify as a protected
liberty. That focus has not always been the concern of the courts.
In cases involving the custody of children, the decision is
usually governed by the child's statutory or common law right
to have his "best interests" pursued. 94 It is odd, then, that
when parents and the state are fighting about how the child
will be educated, the decision so often95 turns simply on 9a6
consideration of the parents' due process and free exercise
rights. One reason for this peculiarity is that laws saying when
and where children have to go to school and what they have
to do there are enforced against the parents. 97 Although this
need not be an obstacle to deciding the case on the basis of
the child's rights, 98 the parties naturally look to their own
94 For examples of neglect statutes, see D.C. CODE ANN. § x6-232o(a) (1973); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-83I(c) (1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 419.507 (1974);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-307(a) (1977). For a list of standards employed in divorce
custody cases, see Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 226, 235-37.
Of course, the question of the parents' constitutional rights has also arisen. See,
e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 44r U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
65i (1972).
95 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 520, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
96 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 322 U.S. i58, x6o (1944).
97 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-o8 & n.2; Barnette, 329 U.S. at 629 & nn.5,
8; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31; cf. Prince, 321 U.S. at 16i (child labor law enforced
against parents).
98 See note 54 supra.
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claims first. A second and more persuasive reason is the reluctance of the courts to recognize constitutionally protected
freedoms for children in matters that their parents usually
decide for them. 99
Yet there is something awry with this focus on the parents.
After all, it is the child who is being forced to go to public
school and forbidden to learn German, and unless the state
succeeds in its coercive conditioning, it is he who will sense
the deprivation most acutely later on. If the parents believe
they will be damned for sending their children to public
school, 10 0 they surely have a free exercise claim of their own.
But cannot one say the same thing a fortiori of the children,
whose souls the parents have failed to save?' 0 ' To make the
point, I begin with the general proposition that "the parent,
being the cause of the child's existing in a helpless condition,
would be indirectly the cause of the suffering and death that
would result to it if neglected."' 1 2 Beyond the fact that, in
the case of blood parents, they have brought the child helpless
into the world, '0 3 they are also the persons most aware of his
circumstances and are consequently in the best position to help
him. 10 4 Their duty to act in his interests, and thus the private
right that he has against them, may be seen as the paradigm
of the "good samaritan" principle. 10 5 The same may be said
to a large extent of adoptive and foster parents, stepparents,
and other guardians; although they have not given the child
life, they have at least taken control of him, and by their
action they have put themselves in the best position to provide
for his needs.
As a moral matter, the extent of the child's right against
his parents finds its source in his dependence. Because during
his early years they hold his life in the balance, they have a
duty to provide him with the essentials of life: not simply food,
clothing, shelter, and health care, but also the education nec99Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 ("There is nothing in the record or in the ordinary
course of human experience to suggest that non-Amish parents generally consult with
children of ages 14-16 if they are placed in a church school of the parents' faith.").
100 Jonas Yoder believed that by sending his children to high school he would
endanger not only their salvation but his own as well. Id. at 209.
1o Id; see id. at 241 (Douglas, J.,dissenting in part).
102 H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 249 (1962).
103 See Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAVING CHILDREN
(0. O'Neill & W. Ruddick eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as HAVING CHILDREN].
116-17
104
See A. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS 75 (1977).
10- Cf. M. SHAPo, THE DUTY TO ACT 38-42 (1977) (duties of teachers, universities,
and lawyers). Indeed, only the existence of family immunities to suit has thus far
prevented the full integration of parental duties - well established in the criminal
law - into the law of tort. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 342 ( 4 th ed. 1971).
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essary for him to discover and develop his talents and to grow
as a responsible moral person. 10 6 In varying degrees, these
private rights are backed by the legal sanctions imposed in
dependency, abuse, and neglect statutes.10 7 Such laws typically require parents, on pain of losing custody, to provide
"adequate food, clothing, shelter[,] education . . .[and] medical . . . care." 108 They may also require provision of "proper
care and attention . . . emotionally or morally."' 1 9 Some of
these demands may be defined objectively so that the general
public concurs in the definition and enforcement is relatively
fair and certain. Obligations to feed, clothe, shelter, and provide urgently needed medical care fit that description. 110 On
the other hand, there is little agreement about what constitutes
either a proper education"' or proper emotional and moral
care and attention.112
Not only is the definition of "proper education" and "proper
care and attention" much debated, but available evidence also
indicates that the child's interests are best served when such
matters are left to private choice. In the first place, the child
3 that
needs the "identity and continuity of cultural heritage" 11
only parents can provide. Perhaps equally important, the state
106
107

See A. MELDEN, supra note 104, at 149-50.
These rights are also enforced in a perhaps less constructive fashion by "cruelty

to children" statutes, which criminalize acts of abuse and endangerment as well as
the deprivation of "necessities of life." For a general review of such laws, see Paulsen,
The Legal Frameworkfor Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 68x-86 (x966).
100 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 1975); cf. ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-546 A.2. (974) ("abuse" defined to include endangering the child's "health
and well-being").
109 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-120 (1981).
110 See generally ABA & INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS

PROJECT,

STANDARDS RELATING

TO ABUSE

AND NEGLECT

Standards i.x-.8, 2.I-.2 & Commentary (tent. draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABUSE
AND NEGLECT]; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 59-109 (i979); Abrams, Problems in Defining Child Abuse and
Neglect, in HAVING CHILDREN, supa note 103, at 156-64.
"I See, e.g., In re Rice, 204 Neb. 732, 285 N.W.2d 223 (i979) (child given
Christian education at home).
12 Compare id. and In re Karr, 66 Misc. 2d 912, 323 N.Y.S.2d 123 (971)
(possibility that child would be raised in Hare Krishna faith not sufficient for finding
neglect), with In re Watson, 95 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950) (child fed only
at religious "banquet" found to be neglected); compare In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d
260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967) (mother's living with man insufficient to establish
improper control of children), and In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968)
(neglect not proved by fact that household consisted of mother and several illegitimate
children), with In re Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 411, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1962) (immoral
conduct of mother deprived child of guidance and constituted neglect).
113 ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note nxo, Standard 1.4 & Commentary. See also
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 9 (1973)-
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can often do little to improve a child's lot, for reasons that
may include not only lack of funds, but also the difficulty of
supervising interpersonal relations and the virtual impossibility
of predicting human development. 114 Finally, the success of
the family venture will depend on giving some measure of
recognition to parental desires to share in the life of their
offspring. 115
Do parents have rights against, as well as duties toward,
their children? I think not. One obvious candidate for such
a right is the parents' claim to the obedience and cooperation
necessary to raise their children successfully. Properly considered, though, this is not an independent right; it is simply a
derivative of the child's right to have discipline and guidance
imposed upon him in his own interests. 1 16 One might also
think that parents have a right to have their children pursue
life prospects acceptable to the parents. But that interest, too,
functions more as a limitation on parental duty than as an
independent right. An Amish mother has no obligation to
support her daughter's decision to go to Yale, but the daughter
likewise has no duty to live out her life in her parents' community. I find it more difficult to say in what way a parent
may claim a debt of gratitude, repayable in the coin of affection and, perhaps, support in later years. There is something
peculiar about saying that such things are "owed";" 7 yet there
is a sense in which love creates duties and so (I suppose)
corresponding rights.
B. The Ascription of Liberties in Claimant-Surrogate
Relations
What does all this talk about private rights mean for the
distribution of rights against the state between parent and
child? Historically, courts have looked to the free exercise
rights"

8

or due process "liberty of parents . . .to direct the

upbringing and education of [their] children.""
1 14

9

I have just

J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 113, at 49-52. See generally

ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note io, Standard 1.3 & Commentary.
115 For a sensitive treatment of this issue, see Ruddick, Parents and Life Prospects,
in HAVING CHILDREN, supra note 103, at 124-25.
116

J. LOCKE,

SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 58 (P.

Laslett ed.

ig6o); see Blustein, supra note 103, at 120-22 (children have duty of facilitation and
noninterference with child-rearing duties).
117 See Blustein, supra note 1O3, at 121-22; English, What Do Grown Children
Owe Their Parents?, in HAVING CHILDREN, supra note 103, at 351.
118 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-32 (1972).
119 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 520, 534-35 (1925); see Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402
(1923) ("the power of parents to control the education of their own").
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argued that parents have no rights against their children, although they do have duties to them. It is perfectly consistent
with this argument to say that parents can claim freedom from
state interference in performance of those private duties. The
parental freedom that the Constitution protects is itself derived
from the child's personal moral right against the parent. The
parent's liberty against the state is akin to the parent's hypothetical "right" against the child to demand cooperation in the
task of rearing. In essence, the latter describes a duty that the
child owes himself, 120 and the former a duty that the state
owes to the child. 121
Accepting that the state owes a duty to the child brings us
closer to the proposition that this Part advances: Constitutional
liberties protect children in the exercise of choices that their
parents have made for them. This proposition radically alters
our conception of the individuals involved and the rights protected. The individual to whom the liberty is attributed will
differ in important respects from the typical adult claimant.
The child in a case such as Wisconsin v. Yoder 12 2 may be
insufficiently mature to assert, waive, or forgive violations of
his free exercise rights. Moreover, what the Constitution protects is not a choice that the child has made but one that his
parents have determined is beneficial to him. Nevertheless,
insofar as his parents are sensitive to their private duties to
the child, the decision that results is his decision in the sense
that it is in his interest. 123 Interference by the state with the
child's "choice" is thus forbidden in much the same way as it
is for conventional adult claimants.

120 See Blustein, supra note io3, at 120.

121 There are some indications that the Supreme Court has recently begun to see
the matter in this light. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75
(1976), and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (979) (plurality opinion), the Court
supported the child in conflict with her parents over abortion. One might say that,
when the parent seeks to act contrary to the child's best interests, he has no right to
freedom from state interference, since he is not in fact fulfilling an obligation to the
child. Moreover, the state would violate its primary duty to the child by supporting
the parental choice. Although I subscribe to that theory, I would dissent from its
application to the specific question in Danforth and Bellotti, not because I place
supreme confidence in parental wisdom and good will, but because I have even less
confidence in the state's ability to determine the child's best interests.
For other suggestions of the principle in text, see Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 84o-41 (x977); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 5oo-o6 (1977) (plurality opinion). Both cases are discussed
in Garvey, supra note 49, at 808-22.
122 406 U.S. 205 (2972).
123 A. MELDEN, supra note 204, at 147-53.
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C. Applications and Limitations of the Surrogate-Choice
View of Freedom
In this Section, I offer a few applications of the surrogatechoice approach to constitutional freedoms and suggest several
significant areas to which it should not be applied. The surrogate approach affords a useful vantage point from which to
view the difficult problem of state intervention in decisions
about the provision of urgently needed medical treatment.
Consider, at the easiest end of the spectrum, a religiously
motivated parental objection to a blood transfusion necessary
to save an infant's life. 124 In favor of permitting the state to
make the choice are the relative unintrusiveness of the procedure, the high probability of success, and the fatal consequences of nonintervention. Moreover, from a purely secular
point of view, the child's need can be objectively defined and
satisfied in a way that commands general public agreement.
Finally, the choice is not one that involves any special parental
familiarity with the child's social and emotional needs. 125 One
could say with some confidence, then, that a parent who withholds authorization is violating the child's private moral right
against the parent and that enforcement of the parent's choice
would thus be inconsistent with the child's liberty interest.
Even the addition of a religious component does not significantly change the equation. The parent has no personal right
that the child live a life - or suffer a death - acceptable to
the parent. 126 Nor is the intervention in a single, short-term,
and fairly unintrusive instance likely to affect the child's moral
development in matters that the parents have an obligation to
control.
On the other hand, as the operation in question becomes
more experimental, as the degree of intrusiveness becomes
greater (for instance, if more pain is involved, the side effects
are more severe, or the duration of the treatment is prolonged),
and as the consequences of inaction become less serious, the
propriety of state interference becomes more questionable.
The parents' knowledge of their child's emotional needs plays
124

See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598, 598 (1968) (per

curiam) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts,

321 U.S. I58, 170 (I944)); In re Pogue, Wash.
Post, Nov. 14, 1974, § C, at I, col. i (No. M-i8-74 , D.C. Super. Ct.,Nov. I1, 1974),

discussed in Goldstein, supra note 49, at 652-53; cases cited i N. DORSEN, P. BENDER
& B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES Ioi8 (4 th
ed. 1976).
125 See Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making Authority: A
Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285, 311-12, 317 (1976).
126 See p. 1781 supra.
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a greater role. 127 Because the decision is not a stark and
certain one between life and death, it involves choices among
values not subject to objective definition and not reinforced by
general public consensus.
The same range of questions arises for medical patients
who, because they are comatose or senile, are incapable of
making their own choices and consequently possess rights to
liberty only in the derivative sense discussed in this Part. If
the surrogate decisionmaker acts within a family relationship
to the rightholder - children deciding for aged parents, one
spouse for another - much of what was said about the matrix
of private rights and duties in Section A obtains with equal
strength. Cases such as In re Quinlan128 show how the factors
of control over the patient, familiarity with his or her desires,
and ties of love, friendship, and gratitude give the patient a
claim to the exercise of the surrogate's judgment and the right
to freedom from state interference with its implementation.
The only significant difference from the case of children is that
systhe surrogate's decision should be guided by the 1patient's
29
tem of values, to the extent that they are known.
The surrogate approach to constitutional freedoms may also
provide some help in analyzing the judicial treatment of uncontested custody arrangements following divorce. An explicit
focus on the child's constitutional entitlement to parental
choices regarding living arrangements, rather than on the arrogant presumptions of the "best interests" standard, would
make interference with joint custody agreements less accept-

able. 130
127
128

Developments - The Constitution and the Family, supra note 47, at 1355-56.
70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see In

re Young, 48 U.S.L.W.
129

2238

(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. ii,I979).

See generally J. RAWLS, supra note

2,

at 249.

To take an extreme case, the

courts should surely have power to prevent the legatees of a senile Catholic priest
from seeking euthanasia for him. In general, judicial activism is warranted when
there is evidence of the claimant's own historic preferences, since courts are competent
to discover these preferences and would not have to construct a hypothetical system
of values for the patient.
130 See Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 288-95 (1978-79); Developments
The Constitution and the Family, supra note 47, at 1323-26. Two other examples
are worth mentioning. Justice Douglas' dissent in Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242, argued
that it was improper for the Court to affirm the right of Amish parents to withdraw
their children from public school after eighth grade without considering the views of
the children. I would maintain, on the contrary, that the mere expression of conflicting desires by the child is not a sufficient justification for state interference with
parental choices - indeed, state intervention to enforce the child's opinions would,
according to my view, restrict the child's freedom of religion. What I have said about
the relation of parents and children also suggests that one of the guidelines laid down
by Justice Powell for minors' abortions in Baird should be reconsidered: the indication
that a pregnant minor female too immature to make the decision on her own could
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Still, there is a significant number of cases in which the
surrogate-choice theory fails to give any meaningful content to
constitutional freedoms. The theory presumes an available
surrogate, related to the claimant by a network of private
rights and obligations, who can stand between him and the
state to retain private control over choices in his interest.
When incompetent persons are under the direct control of the
state, no such surrogate exists. This group includes children
who are wards of the state, patients in state mental institutions, and even those receiving state medical care who have
no remaining family ties.
V. THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF FREEDOM: A THEORY OF
THE RIGHT TO "LIFE"

The freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution make no
sense for an incompetent individual under state control and
lacking a surrogate to make choices for him. The state is
charged with making critical choices for the individual; yet it
is from the state's interference with choice that constitutional
freedoms are intended to provide protection. In this Part, I
argue that the residue of constitutional protection left behind
when freedom enters this fourth dimension may most appropriately be called a right to "life"; those over whom the state
exercises total control are entitled by this right to a certain
minimal level of benefits from the state. I then try to illustrate
and justify this right by discussing the right to treatment for
the civilly committed mentally ill. Finally, I suggest several
other applications of the right to life.
A. A Note on Terminology
Of the rights to "life, liberty, and property" protected by
the fourteenth amendment, the first has received by far the
narrowest interpretation. 1 3 1 I propose to use the term "life"
not be required to get parental consent unless an independent judicial determination
were also available. 443 U.S. at 643-48 (plurality opinion). For such an individual,
a requirement of parental consent does nothing more than ensure that a third party,
the doctor, assists in securing to the minor the private right that she has against her
parents. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, ioi S. Ct. 1164 (i98i) (upholding statute requiring
doctor to notify parents before performing abortion on minor). To say that her
substantive due process liberty is better protected by leaving the choice to the state
rather than to the parents is to say that what would ordinarily count as a restraint
of freedom - state interference with choice - is in fact the process by which the
choice should be made.
131 It is worth noting, however, that Blackstone, who gave the term "liberty" a
rather restricted definition, i W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134, understood
"life" to refer to "the right of personal security [that] consists in a person's legal and
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broadly, in the way we use it when we speak of "a life worth
living." My notion of a "right to life" includes, for an incompetent in state custody, claims to food, clothing, shelter, medical care, a decent physical environment, and, in addition,
education, treatment, or habilitation. The most obvious objection to this approach is that it subjects to new tensions
constitutional language whose meaning has long been settled.
But that is not at all different from what has happened with
the word "liberty," whose common law and pre-Civil War
meaning extended little beyond the freedom from physical restraint. 132 The
same expansion has characterized the term
133
"property."

However, the term "life" is not simply "the most convenient
vehicle into which to pack all kinds of rights"; 134 it is also the
most suitable term, given the nature of the duties undertaken
by the state. In discussing the child's private claims against
his parents in Part IV, I pointed out that the child's claims
have their source in his dependence. Because they control his
life, the parents' duty encompasses all the essentials of life. 135
It is this obligation
that the state assumes when it acts as
136
parens patriae.
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation." Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, i8 NOMOS: DUE PROCESS 7 (I977).
132 See generally Hough, Due Process of Law - To-Day, 32 HARV. L. REv. 218,
222-23 (1918); Monaghan, Of "Liberty' and "Property', 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405,
411-12 (I977); Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926).
133 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
134 Warren, supra note 132, at 439 (referring to the term liberty).
13sSee p. 1780 supra.
136 An alternate candidate for characterizing the minimum demands posited in this
Part, one proposed several years ago by Professor Kurland, is the privileges or
immunities clause of the 14 th amendment. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 2972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 418-20. It suffers
from more than a century of neglect, since The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (2873), rendered it a "practical nullity." THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 965 (E. Corwin ed. 1953). Moreover, reading the clause

for all it is worth would solve just half the problem we are concerned with, since it
applies only to the states. The obvious way to extend its directive to the federal
government is to do what was done in the case of equal protection - read it into the
fifth amendments due process clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). But
that only brings us back to the problem of deciding whether the rights at issue are
best described as "life," "liberty," or "property." I would be willing to overlook even
this problem, given the historically more plausible argument for finding substantive
guarantees in the privileges or immunities clause, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 25-28 (I980), if there were some indication that the content of the privileges
or immunities clause would be easier to specify than the content of an expanded right
to "life." In either case, however, we would be starting from scratch. See id. at 98;
Benoit, The Privilegesor Immunities Clause of the FourteenthAmendment: Can There
Be Life After Death?, II SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 6I, 101-02 (1976).
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The right for which I am contending is far narrower than
a general claim of constitutional entitlement to basic welfare
rights for everyone, 13 7 for the state's obligation to provide
services only arises when the state has supplanted private
decisionmakers. In fact, as a matter of constitutional law, the
right does not even mean that the state has an affirmative duty
to step in to care for orphans, the mentally handicapped, the
aged, and so on. It might be morally reprehensible for the
state to allow such people to die for want of help, but that is
another matter. Finally, I would grant this right against the
state only to those for whom freedom can have none of the
meanings discussed in Parts Il-IV. Thus, it must be shown
that: (i) the individual in question is incompetent to make a
specific choice (thus satisfying the concern of the laissez-faire
approach that categories of incompetents not be drawn too
broadly); (2) the decision is sufficiently important that one
cannot allow him to make it solely to promote his autonomous
development (rendering inapplicable the instrumental conception of liberty); and (3) no private decisionmaker is sufficiently
close to the individual to make a better choice than the state
could make (rendering the surrogate conception of liberty useless). Any attempt at state control that did not satisfy all three
conditions would violate the individual's constitutional liberties.
B. An Application: The Right to Treatment
Suppose that an individual is reliably diagnosed as severely
psychotic-schizophrenic, that a satisfactory treatment is available, and that he irrationally refuses it. 138 Those facts would
put him beyond the range of laissez faire even as a limiting
principle. Suppose further that the patient's behavior presents
a danger to himself because he avoids all contact with other
people and is therefore unable to acquire food, medical care
unrelated to his illness, and other necessities of life. Any
instrumental value in allowing him to make his own decision
would thus disappear. If we add that he has no family or
friends willing to assist him either by deciding about care or
by providing the essentials of life, I believe that involuntary
civil commitment would be justified. If the state took that
step, however, I would answer the question left open in
O'Connor v. Donaldson139 by saying that the state's duties go
137 See Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 659.
138 Suppose, for example, that he believes that he is radioactive and that no one

should touch him. I borrow the example from A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND

LAW 66-69 (x975).
139 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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beyond mere provision of food, clothing, shelter, and routine
medical care, and encompass as well the obligation to provide
some accepted form of treatment for a patient's psychotic condition.
What basis is there for reading a right to such a package
of benefits - including treatment - into the Constitution?
The question is one to which a number of unsatisfactory answers have been proposed. 140 I begin with the proposition
that the state owes to one involuntarily committed to its custody the same moral obligation that Part IV attributed to
140 The quest to find a constitutional basis for the right to treatment has been

going on for some time. The most recent attempt to find a basis for the right to
treatment, however, looked to a statute rather than the Constitution. In Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 49 U.S.L.W. 4363 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1981), the
Supreme Court rejected a claim that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6ooo-6o8i (I976 & Supp. 1i 1979), guarantees a
right to "treatment, services, and habilitation" to mentally retarded individuals committed to institutions run by participating states.
The Fifth Circuit in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 5o7 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), suggested that provision of treatment was a
constitutionally required quid pro quo owed the individual who is deprived of his
liberty without the usual criminal restrictions on methods of proof, the demand for
a specific act, and a sentence limited to a fixed period of time. Id. at 521-27. The
difficulty with the quid pro quo theory is that the exchange it proposes makes no
sense. If the state - because of a relaxed procedure - locks up a sane person, he
would hardly consider it a fair trade if he were treated for schizophrenia. And if the
state locked up a person for five years after proving by the most procedurally scrupulous methods possible that he was schizophrenic, he might properly feel cheated
that the state refused to provide treatment after proving so carefully that he needed
it.
An alternate due process theory is most commonly identified with Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 5o3
F.2d 1305 (5 th Cir. 1974); see Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn.
1974) (dictum). See generally Dowben, Legal Rights of the Mentally Impaired, x6
HOUSTON L. REV. 833, 839-40 (979); Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A
Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of ConstitutionalRight to Treatment Theories, 2o Asuz. L. REv. i, 5-12 (1978). This theory, which was also adopted
by the Fifth Circuit in Donaldson, would base the right on the notion that legislative
means must rationally promote legislative ends: "To deprive any citizen of his or her
liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals
of due process." Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. at 785, aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (Sth Cir. 1974); see Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507,
520-21 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See also Rouse

v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. x966) (dictum); Welsch v. Likens, 373 F.
Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686, 687 (N.D.
Ill. I973); Developments -

Civil Commitment, supra note 44, at 1326-27.

The

problem with Wyatt's means and ends argument is that the state's provision of simple
custodial care is perfectly rational if the state commits an individual for the announced
purpose of providing custodial care rather than "for humane therapeutic reasons."
The popularity of both due process approaches has suffered since the Supreme
Court in Donaldson stripped the Fifth Circuit's opinion of precedential effect. 422
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U.S. at 578 n.X2. Subsequent cases have picked up the hint. See Morales v. Turman,
562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1976).
See also Spece, supra, at 4-,5; Note, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed:
A New Eighth Amendment Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 732-35 (1978).
Some cases derive an eighth amendment approach from Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (r962), which prohibited incarceration for the status crime of being a
narcotics addict, and conclude that it is cruel and unusual punishment to confine the
mentally disabled without provision of treatment. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dictum); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 2295, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affid in relevant part, 612 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4363 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2981); Welsch v.
Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp.
575, 598-603 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). It is questionable, however, whether the eighth
amendment has any application outside the criminal process. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1977). Even if it does, the issue in right-to-treatment
cases would be whether custodial confinement in a mental institution counted as
"punishment," a matter taken for granted with regard to the county jail to which
Robinson would have been sent. 370 U.S. at 66o n.i. One could draw the lesson
that mere custodial confinement is "punishment" from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976), which held that deliberate refusal to provide medical treatment to a prison
inmate might violate the eighth amendment. Id. at io4-o5; see Note, supra, at 731.
But it is difficult to see mere neglect of the mental patient as in any sense retributive
or deterrent, and hence punitive, whereas the Court is inclined to view prison brutality
as "part of the total punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his
crime and, as such, . . . a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny." Ingraham,
430 U.S. at 669 (quoting lower court's opinion, Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909,
915 (5th Cir. 1976)).
A final ground advanced for the right to treatment is sometimes tied to the equal
protection clause, see Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 44, at 1329-30,
and sometimes discussed as an unadorned right to the least restrictive alternative,
Spece, supra, at 3, 33-47. In either case, it amounts to an application of strict
scrutiny to the deprivations of primary freedoms that commitment may entail: travel,
speech, association, voting, sexual relations, bodily integrity, etc. Chambers, supra
note 92, at 1155-68; see Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 44, at 2293201. Interference with such paramount rights can only be justified if the state demonstrates that its interest is sufficiently compelling and that the intrusion results in the
least possible restriction of individual liberty. Because treatment may lead to an
earlier release or greater freedom within the institution, it is argued that treatment is
constitutionally required for all commitments save those in which the state can prove
that treatment will be ineffective. See Spece, supra, at 42-43. The problem with
this approach is its unquestioning assignment of value to the primary rights affected
by commitment. On one hand, if the illness has no effect on, say, the schizophrenic's
competence to vote, the state would show more respect for his constitutional right by
providing an absentee ballot than it would by providing treatment leading to an
earlier release. On the other band, it is difficult to see how the inmate has a
fundamental right to those freedoms affected by his illness - in the case of one who
believes he is radioactive and shuns all contact with other human beings, for example,
freedom of association or interests related to sexual relations. If he is unable to make
rational choices regarding such matters, he is "free" before commitment only in the
descriptive sense that he is subject to no governmental constraint. See p. 2759 &
notes 13, 24 supra. If, as I have argued, the consistent interpretation of the Constitution has been that freedom presupposes the ability to choose, his enjoyment of those
liberties is not diminished by the fact of commitment, and they provide no basis for
the state's obligation to treat.
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surrogates acting within a family relationship to the rightholder. The state exercises control over the patient's life to a
degree equivalent to a parent's control over the life of a child;
it prescribes diet, dress, living conditions, schedule, medication, companionship, and rules for enforcement of its regimen,
and to a great degree interdicts the private provision of those
same necessities. The reverse side of the state's control is the
patient's dependence, a fact that is guaranteed if the laissezfaire, instrumental, and surrogate tests are applied before commitment is permitted. Given the absence of private alternatives and the institution's continuing supervision of his behavior, the state may be both the only entity able to provide help
and the entity most familiar with the individual's needs.
Granted that a moral right against the state exists, is there
any basis for constitutionalizing the good samaritan principle
- for saying that the state may not have a duty to act, but
that if it does take control of an incompetent's life, it cannot
stop short of providing appropriate treatment? The answer is
that the state creates a right to "life" in the same way it creates
property rights and liberty rights. Strictly speaking, there is
14 1
no such thing as a constitutional right to welfare payments, 43
1
14 2
to a teaching job at a state college,
to a driver's license,
144
45
to parole,
to probation,1 or to "good-time credit." 146 Yet
the Supreme Court has held that the government may create
property and liberty interests in such benefits by statutes,
"rules[,] or mutually explicit understandings." 147 The process by
which such interests are created need not follow any particular
formula:
[A]bsence of . . . an explicit contractual provision may not
always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a "property"
interest in re-employment .... Explicit contractual provisions may be supplemented by other agreements implied from
"the promisor's words and8 conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances." 14
The meaning of these due process cases for the right to
"life" advanced in this Part is this: Once the state, by involuntary commitment, has taken complete control of the individual's life and required his total dependence upon the insti141 Goldberg

v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (I97I).
143 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
144Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
14s Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (973).
146 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 5
557 (1974).
147Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 6oi (1972).
148 Id. at 601-02 (quoting 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 562, at 287 (I96o)).
142
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tution, it is no longer in a position to make disclaimers about
what the individual can expect. Its constitutional obligation
to care for the incompetent arises not from what it explicitly
promises - which may be nothing - but from what it does.
By making the committed person look solely to the state for
the necessities of life, it has in the clearest possible fashion
created an expectation. The constitutional duty is coextensive
with the degree of the claimant's dependence; its duty to act
as surrogate is not simply a moral obligation but a constitutional one, equal to its duty not to interfere with private
performance of the same function.
Could the state explicitly deny that it intends to provide
anything more than food, clothing, and shelter, thereby getting
itself off the hook of having to provide treatment? I think
not. The crucial fact is that the relationship of control and
dependence is not offered but imposed. By taking complete
control of the institutionalized individual's life, the state steps
into a well-defined role that our society endows with welldefined obligations. The paradigm is the relation of control
and dependence between parent and child - a role that entails
parental duties to provide not only food, clothing, and shelter,
but in addition education and proper moral care and attention.
The role the state plays should thus define the contours of its
obligation. 149
C. FurtherApplications of the Right to "Life"
In this final Section, I would like to suggest a few other
applications of the right to "life." A logical extension of the
right to treatment just discussed is a right to habilitation for
the institutionalized mentally retarded. Such a claim does not
require new grounds on which to base the right; the same
factors of control and dependence, familiarity with the individual's needs, and capacity to meet them provide a foundation
for the state's constitutional obligations. 150 The only signifi149

Even so, why say that treatment is owed when the incompetent has no expec-

tation of private help that he loses by entering the institution? The answer is that
there is no reason to suppose that the state's constitutional duty must have a quasicontractual basis. After all, the recipients of government relief in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), had to be unable to support themselves from other sources, id.
at 355 n.i; thus, they gave up nothing by their reliance on state aid. The crucial
point is that the state is constitutionally required to provide for those whom it chooses,
expressly or impliedl, to make its dependents.
,so Cases and commentators have not hesitated to extend the right to treatment
for the mentally ill to encompass a right to habilitation for the retarded. See, e.g.,
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314-22 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), affid in relevant part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.

U.S.L.W. 4363 (U.S. Apr.

20,

1979)

(en banc), rev'd, 49

1981); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp.

1209

(E.D.
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cant difference between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded is that most commitments of the retarded are "voluntary," that is, initiated by the family. This fact appears to
leave open to the state the argument that, since the retardate's
life is still being controlled by private surrogates, the state's
only obligation is not to interfere actively with the surrogate's
choices. Thus, if the state provides inadequate care, the
state may claim that the parents are ultimately responsible.151
But applying this argument to long-term commitment stretches
the meaning of "private control" beyond recognition. When
the surrogate turns over total care of the incompetent for any
extended period, he effectively indicates his inability or unwillingness to look after the incompetent's interests. The state
must accept the responsibility that comes with the power it
has assumed and provide the habilitation that the private
surrogate would ordinarily provide.
State removal of children from abusive and neglectful parents presents a more complex problem. The primacy of choices
made by familial surrogates suggests that state intervention
should be limited to cases in which it would harm the child
demonstrably less than his current family situation - cases of
actual or imminently threatened severe physical harm, sexual
abuse, or perhaps serious and reliably diagnosed emotional
damage. 152 If, for these reasons or because of abandonment,
parental rights must be terminated, the right to "life" requires
careful attention to the state's manifest inability to take over
the role vacated by the parents. 153 This inability means that,
prior to taking direct control of the child, the state must
explore all alternatives, such as relatives, foster care, and
group homes, focusing on their resemblance to the child's original home situation.
The disposition of juveniles who have been adjudicated
delinquent presents still more difficult issues. Although one
La. 1976); Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487, 491-500 (D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 39o (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nona. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Renelli v. State Comm'r of Mental Hygiene,

73 Misc. 2d 261, 263, 340 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (97.3).

Right to Habilitation,in

See generally Halpern, The

PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note

go, at 385; Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded
Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124
(1976).
151 Although it dealt with procedural due process rights of juveniles "voluntarily"
committed by their parents, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), relied heavily on
the theory outlined in text. See id. at 602.
152 For more careful treatment of the grounds for termination of parental rights,
see ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note

i1o;

supra note iio; Mnookin, Foster Care -

J.

GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.

REV. 599 (1973).
153 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A.

SOLNIT,

In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC.
SOLNIT, supra note iio, at 11-12.
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can find considerable support for a right to treatment for such
juveniles,1 5 4 the problem is complicated by the fact that, unlike abandoned children or the mentally ill, the juvenile offender has been found to have committed a crime punishable
without treatment when committed by an adult.)5 5 Many
offenses are grounds for depriving adults of liberty, and in
some cases even of life. If there is a reason for treating the
juvenile differently, it is because his responsibility is diminished in proportion to his lesser capacity for choice. 156 If the
hierarchy advocated in this Article15 7 is used, the laissez-faire
conception of liberty requires case-by-case adjudication of competence in such an important matter (though, in this case, the
juvenile will want to show that he is incompetent). For juveniles found to be of diminished capacity, the right to "life"
suggests that when the state commits the delinquent to the
coercive custody of an institution, it must assume the role left
vacant or unfulfilled by the juvenile's parents - a point recognized by a number of state delinquency statutes.' 5 8 What
is troubling about the theory is the current, and maybe absolute, impossibility of putting it into practice. If we are to
accept the idea that an institution is to have custody of the
juvenile delinquent convicted of certain offenses, we inescapably abandon all hope of providing the love, stability, fair
discipline, and mutual self-interest that characterize the best
family relationships. Those are qualities of care that the law
is simply incapable of enforcing.
VI. CONCLUSION

Medieval painters often gave the infant Jesus a child's body
and an old man's head. Judges and lawyers frequently think
of children that way - as simply miniature adults with the
IS4

See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex.

974), rev'd and

remanded, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 430 U.S.
322 (I977); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Inmates of the Boys' Training School v.

Mfleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I.
(S.D.N.Y.

1972)

1972); Cf.

Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575

(adequate treatment to nondelinquent infant detainees required by

due process and prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment). See generally ABA
& INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS Standard 4.1 & Commentary (I980);

Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEo.
L.J. 848 (x969); Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment, 6 FAM. L.Q. 279
(1972).

155 Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 ( 5 th Cir. 1977).
156 See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 173-83 (1968).
157 See p. 1761 supra.
"S' See, e.g., Juvenile Court Act, § 1-2(1) (1965), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 7012(l) (i977); IND. CODE § 31-5-7-I (976);

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2 (970).
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same sort of constitutional freedoms. In defining the constitutional freedoms of the mentally ill, the retarded, and other
incompetents, the legal system often makes the same mistake.
Because these individuals lack the capacity to make fully rational choices, constitutional freedoms and the choices they
protect must often be justified for them in different ways. This
Article suggests a hierarchy of possible justifications for granting freedoms to persons of diminished capacity. First, we
should look to see whether the deprivation of a particular
constitutional freedom is so severe that we must make individualized determinations about competence to exercise it.
Second, we should investigate whether there are instrumental
reasons for allowing incompetent persons to exercise freedoms:
to train children in the exercise of liberties, or to aid the
institutionalized mentally ill in seeking freedom if they have
been wrongfully confined. Third, when too much is at stake
to allow the incompetent to make choices for himself, or when
he is simply incapable of choosing at all, we should protect
his right to have decisions made on his behalf by those closest
to him - typically, his family. Finally, when these three
options have been exhausted, the state may step in to make
choices for the incompetent. When it does so, it assumes all
the duties that caretakers such as parents normally owe to
their charges, including both the familiar necessities of life and
treatment or habilitation as well.

